Appendices

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A Figures

Figure A.1: Attitudes towards Redistribution and SES index



Notes: The figure shows the average preference for redistribution by ventile of the socioeconomic status index. The red horizontal line at 4.5 indicates the midpoint of the attitude scale. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.

Figure A.2: Country-level Attitudes towards Redistribution by SES Group



Notes: The figure shows the average preference for redistribution by socioeconomic status group for each country in our main sample.

Figure A.3: Correlation of Attitudes between SES Groups



Notes: The figure shows the country-level correlations of redistributive preferences between the different socioeconomic status groups.

Figure A.4: Locus of Control and SES Index



Notes: The figure shows a binned scatterplot of locus of control by ventile of the socioeconomic status index controlling for wave and country fixed effects. Locus of control is measured with the question: *Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them.* (0: No choice at all; 9: A great deal of choice).

Figure A.5: Distance to Modal and Median Attitude by SES Group



Notes: This figure shows the average difference in the redistributive preferences of the different socioeconomic status groups from the modal and the median attitude in a country. Error bars indicate bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications.

Figure A.6: Predictions by SES of Laypeople



Notes: The figure shows results from the prediction study with lay people, splitting the full sample into the bottom 10%, middle 10% and top 10% of the socioeconomic status index of respondents (N=187). The socioeconomic status index was computed in the same way as in our main study. We used the same survey items as in the WVS to elicit education, income, and self-reported social class. The figure indicates the share of individuals for each social class who indicated that the relationship between that social class and actual redistribution is the strongest. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. See Appendix F for a detailed description of the prediction studies.

B Tables

Table B.1: Correlates of the SES Index

	(1) Top income	(2) Bottom income	(3) Supervisor	(4) Pol. party membership
Top 5%	0.346		0.267	0.045
	(0.055)		(0.013)	(0.009)
Bottom 5%		0.380		
		(0.047)		
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reference category mean	0.025	0.060	0.314	0.146
R-squared	0.209	0.132	0.090	0.141
N	43153	43153	106648	225728
Countries	31	31	77	89

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are household income brackets (columns 1 and 2), being in a supervising role at work (column 3), and membership in a political party (column 4). *Top 5%* and *Bottom 5%* are dummy variables for an individual belonging to the top 5% or bottom 5% regarding the socioeconomic status index of a given country. *Top income* and *Bottom income* are dummy variables referring to the top and bottom income bracket, respectively. The measure of income used for the socioeconomic status index and the measure of income brackets in a given country are different variables. *Supervisor*, and *Pol. party membership* are dummy variables for being in a supervising role at work and being member of a political party. *Reference category mean* shows the sample mean of the dependent variable for the bottom 95% (in columns 1, 3, and 4) and the top 95% (in column 2), respectively.

Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of the SES Groups

	Bottom 5%	Middle 5%	Top 5%	N	Countries
Male	0.44	0.49	0.53	42,519	94
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)		
Age	47.92	39.31	38.58	42,488	94
	(17.47)	(15.35)	(14.06)		
Married	0.61	0.65	0.65	41,985	94
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.48)		
Children	2.42	1.73	1.47	41,200	93
	(1.69)	(1.52)	(1.41)		
Employed	0.35	0.56	0.70	41,382	94
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.46)		
Unemployed	0.16	0.09	0.04	41,382	94
	(0.37)	(0.29)	(0.20)		
Manual work	7.07	5.07	2.53	17,295	77
	(2.56)	(2.93)	(2.68)		
Routine work	6.86	5.52	3.79	17,283	77
	(2.62)	(2.73)	(2.93)		
Immigrant parent	0.09	0.10	0.10	20,273	72
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)		
Political left	4.36	4.30	4.12	30,556	88
	(2.62)	(2.35)	(2.41)		

Notes: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of different background characteristics separately for each SES group. Higher values for manual work and routine work indicate that the tasks at work are more manual than cognitive and more routine than creative, respectively (measured on a 10-point scale). Immigrant parent is a dummy variable indicating that at least one parent is an immigrant. Political left measures self-reported political views using a 10-point scale, where higher values indicating political views more to the left.

Table B.3: Attitudes and Absolute Redistribution

	Absolute redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	1.161			-2.095	-1.652	-1.306
	(0.828)			(0.922)	(0.863)	(0.850)
Middle 5%		2.796		0.949	0.432	-0.274
		(0.684)		(1.144)	(1.032)	(0.999)
Bottom 5%			3.175	3.389	2.669	2.764
			(0.453)	(0.797)	(0.673)	(0.656)
ln(GDP per capita)					1.095	1.226
					(0.602)	(0.587)
ln(Population)					-0.852	-0.747
					(0.378)	(0.334)
Democracy					4.055	2.956
					(1.260)	(1.152)
Gini pre-tax						0.331
						(0.099)
Constant	3.958	-3.740	-7.277	-4.970	-10.623	-24.982
	(2.930)	(2.671)	(2.041)	(2.761)	(5.731)	(6.439)
F-stat p-val	0.161	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.021	0.157	0.301	0.332	0.484	0.572
N	94	93	94	93	91	91

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is the measure for absolute redistribution. Missing values for absolute redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.4: Persistence of Preferences for Redistribution

	Preferences for redistribution								
	(1) Top5%	(2) Mid5%	(3) Bot5%	(4) Top10%	(5) Mid10%	(6) Bot10%	(7) Top33%	(8) Mid33%	(9) Bot33%
First year	0.545	0.584	0.677	0.615	0.609	0.611	0.694	0.707	0.608
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.101)	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.125)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Time gap	0.057	0.047	0.056	0.060	0.054	0.052	0.063	0.057	0.048
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Constant	1.526	1.669	1.430	1.319	1.567	1.742	1.060	1.136	1.678
	(0.409)	(0.501)	(0.496)	(0.394)	(0.510)	(0.505)	(0.450)	(0.433)	(0.490)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.305	0.324	0.460	0.369	0.367	0.449	0.432	0.493	0.431
N	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is the measure redistributive preferences in the last available survey year for the socioeconomic group indicated in the column header. *First year* measures redistribution preferences in the first available survey year. *Time gap* is the number of years between the first and last available survey year.

Table B.5: Split Sample Analysis by Waves

	Wave 3 & 4		Wave 5 & 6	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top 5%	-2.017	-1.318	-7.556	-4.785
	(3.192)	(2.618)	(2.066)	(1.918)
Middle 5%	-1.542	-3.420	5.105	2.692
	(3.811)	(2.984)	(2.199)	(2.169)
Bottom 5%	6.606	5.553	6.019	4.827
	(2.336)	(1.864)	(1.779)	(1.723)
ln(GDP per capita)		4.690		2.861
		(1.773)		(1.623)
ln(Population)		-2.409		-1.934
		(0.946)		(0.738)
Democracy		4.616		2.349
		(3.929)		(3.254)
Gini pre-tax		0.476		0.595
		(0.313)		(0.299)
Constant	-0.453	-49.642	-7.155	-49.615
	(7.391)	(22.155)	(5.485)	(20.037)
F-stat p-val	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.186	0.459	0.358	0.548
N	62	62	76	74

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. We show the main results only using survey data from waves 3 and 4 in column 3. The time period of the measure of relative redistribution (2005) and the control variables (1994) is chosen accordingly. We show the main results only using survey data from waves 5 and 6 in column 4. We again choose the corresponding time period for the measure of relative redistribution (2015) and the control variables (2004). Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.6: Attitudes and Relative Redistribution: 10% Groups

	Relative redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 10%	2.925			-7.299	-4.569	-4.022
	(1.686)			(2.466)	(2.272)	(2.319)
Middle 10%		6.404		4.699	1.462	0.276
		(1.352)		(3.291)	(2.989)	(2.955)
Bottom 10%			6.728	7.000	6.464	6.679
			(1.114)	(2.010)	(1.812)	(1.778)
ln(GDP per capita)					2.592	2.808
					(1.170)	(1.184)
ln(Population)					-2.132	-1.962
					(0.781)	(0.731)
Democracy					5.938	4.371
					(2.580)	(2.581)
Gini pre-tax						0.518
						(0.248)
Constant	6.418	-10.144	-14.963	-9.857	-24.026	-46.704
	(6.039)	(5.364)	(4.916)	(5.369)	(10.548)	(14.647)
F-stat p-val	0.083	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.030	0.177	0.270	0.336	0.475	0.526
N	95	95	95	95	93	93

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 10%*, *Middle 10%*, and *Bottom 10%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 10%, middle 10%, and top 10% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.7: Attitudes and Relative Redistribution: Tercile Groups

	Relative redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 33%	4.389			-10.545	-7.424	-7.416
	(1.662)			(3.489)	(3.311)	(3.480)
Middle 33%		6.160		-0.253	-2.448	-3.097
		(1.428)		(5.203)	(5.065)	(5.070)
Bottom 33%			7.215	15.113	13.109	13.233
			(1.214)	(3.230)	(3.190)	(3.214)
ln(GDP per capita)					2.231	2.445
					(1.114)	(1.114)
ln(Population)					-2.128	-1.889
					(0.729)	(0.693)
Democracy					6.319	4.527
					(2.372)	(2.364)
Gini pre-tax						0.541
						(0.239)
Constant	0.241	-8.679	-15.743	-10.345	-21.715	-45.377
	(6.055)	(5.510)	(5.083)	(5.266)	(9.875)	(13.797)
F-stat p-val	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.069	0.162	0.258	0.367	0.503	0.559
N	95	95	95	95	93	93

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 33%*, *Middle 33%*, and *Bottom 33%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 33%, middle 33%, and top 33% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.8: Attitudes and Relative Redistribution: Non-imputed Values

	Relative redistribution (non-imputed)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	-2.647			-9.732	-5.330	-4.878
	(2.638)			(2.991)	(2.752)	(2.656)
Middle 5%		4.245		4.335	-1.115	-0.823
		(2.256)		(3.228)	(3.084)	(3.059)
Bottom 5%			6.823	7.286	7.734	6.574
			(1.655)	(2.463)	(2.097)	(2.031)
ln(GDP per capita)					7.786	7.531
					(2.966)	(2.431)
ln(Population)					-2.129	-2.306
					(1.085)	(0.985)
Democracy					2.492	2.466
					(5.894)	(5.238)
Gini pre-tax						0.850
						(0.364)
Constant	32.600	3.217	-14.044	0.236	-61.151	-94.322
	(10.177)	(10.311)	(8.904)	(10.433)	(28.988)	(24.719)
F-stat p-val	0.316	0.060	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.018	0.054	0.197	0.331	0.538	0.660
N	50	50	50	50	50	50

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is the measure for relative redistribution reported in the SWIID, i.e., missing values are not imputed. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.9: Attitudes and Relative Redistribution: Excluding Negative Redistribution

	Relative redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	2.143			-4.808	-3.729	-3.399
	(1.699)			(1.994)	(1.816)	(1.849)
Middle 5%		5.943		2.911	1.439	0.701
		(1.281)		(2.065)	(2.082)	(2.149)
Bottom 5%			6.460	6.437	5.468	5.591
			(0.952)	(1.379)	(1.324)	(1.373)
ln(GDP per capita)					1.880	2.064
					(1.181)	(1.205)
ln(Population)					-1.531	-1.471
					(0.727)	(0.704)
Democracy					7.527	6.431
					(2.420)	(2.437)
Gini pre-tax						0.297
						(0.220)
Constant	10.490	-6.981	-13.238	-8.488	-18.520	-31.715
	(5.888)	(5.106)	(4.241)	(5.624)	(10.740)	(14.352)
F-stat p-val	0.207	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.019	0.183	0.329	0.370	0.499	0.515
N	91	90	91	90	88	88

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. We exclude countries with negative relative redistribution (Indonesia, Ukraine, and Tanzania). Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.10: SES Groups using Income Values

	Relative redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top income	4.846			0.020	0.445	-0.452
	(2.561)			(3.370)	(2.988)	(2.611)
Middle income		6.425		-1.802	-2.164	0.049
		(1.505)		(3.966)	(3.745)	(3.535)
Bottom income			5.950	7.983	6.599	4.770
			(1.022)	(2.849)	(2.916)	(2.947)
ln(GDP per capita)					4.402	4.496
					(2.073)	(2.072)
ln(Population)					-2.333	-2.308
					(1.042)	(0.981)
Democracy					6.566	4.987
					(3.603)	(3.733)
Gini pre-tax						0.534
						(0.322)
Constant	2.330	-10.034	-10.342	-11.710	-42.850	-64.927
	(8.928)	(6.174)	(4.487)	(10.679)	(19.529)	(22.569)
F-stat p-val	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.081	0.153	0.231	0.250	0.420	0.479
N	59	97	93	56	56	56

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top income*, *Middle income*, and *Bottom income* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined using household income measured on a 10-point scale. We define the top, middle, and bottom SES groups based on the response options 1 (*Bottom income*), 5 (*Middle income*), and 10 (*Top income*), respectively. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.11: Split Sample Analysis by Democracy

	Democratic		Nondemocratic	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top 5%	-8.146	-4.512	-1.254	0.024
	(3.108)	(2.577)	(2.109)	(2.398)
Middle 5%	2.746	-1.698	0.248	-1.722
	(3.066)	(2.822)	(2.828)	(3.173)
Bottom 5%	7.447	6.238	4.274	5.529
	(2.151)	(2.151)	(2.041)	(2.027)
ln(GDP per capita)		6.608		-1.143
		(1.951)		(1.026)
ln(Population)		-2.010		-2.390
		(0.994)		(0.863)
Gini pre-tax		0.584		0.352
		(0.320)		(0.281)
Constant	1.348	-67.080	-6.271	-7.299
	(8.500)	(22.695)	(6.704)	(14.285)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.078	0.003
R-squared	0.320	0.549	0.241	0.456
N	58	57	35	34

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. We split the sample into democratic and nondemocratic countries, following Acemoglu *et al.* (2019). Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.12: Attitudes and Relative Redistribution: Polity IV Democracy Measure

	Relative redistribution		
	(1) Full sample	(2) Democ.	(3) NonDemoc.
Top 5%	-1.919	-1.995	1.206
	(2.023)	(2.794)	(2.709)
Middle 5%	-1.279	-3.888	-2.247
	(2.314)	(3.700)	(2.987)
Bottom 5%	5.727	5.066	5.385
	(1.428)	(2.167)	(1.878)
ln(GDP per capita)	2.956	8.306	-0.649
	(1.256)	(1.872)	(1.116)
ln(Population)	-1.772	-2.365	-1.817
	(0.725)	(1.138)	(0.947)
Gini pre-tax	0.570	0.706	0.314
	(0.266)	(0.322)	(0.251)
Democracy	5.841		
	(2.778)		
Constant	-48.310	-79.753	-12.458
	(15.820)	(22.071)	(14.748)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.012
R-squared	0.545	0.586	0.371
N	89	53	36

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. We show the main results using the Polity IV score as an alternative measure for democratization in column 1. We classify a country as democratic if the Polity IV score is equal or larger than 6. We split the sample using this measure of democracy in columns 2 and 3. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.13: Alternative Measures of Preferences

	Attitude inequality (change)		Perception top taxes (change)		Attitude redistribution (level)		Attitude top taxes (level)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Top 5%	-23.371	-17.940	-21.386	-12.170	-27.620	-14.852	-39.258	-22.787
	(5.605)	(4.719)	(6.866)	(5.030)	(7.684)	(4.737)	(11.788)	(11.240)
Middle 5%	10.059	14.272	-16.947	3.615	7.014	5.449	-17.621	-7.481
	(11.112)	(7.716)	(8.860)	(7.595)	(11.194)	(8.722)	(17.480)	(11.195)
Bottom 5%	16.942	9.139	30.885	18.761	22.861	15.611	30.427	23.924
	(9.686)	(6.005)	(8.852)	(6.816)	(9.583)	(8.724)	(13.587)	(9.006)
ln(GDP per capita)		7.253		9.719		7.746		10.979
		(3.049)		(3.570)		(3.911)		(3.220)
ln(Population)		-2.799		-2.405		-2.419		-2.201
		(0.843)		(0.876)		(0.908)		(1.224)
Democracy		-2.643		-2.023		1.555		0.020
		(4.845)		(5.285)		(5.443)		(5.314)
Gini pre-tax		1.049		1.301		0.775		0.738
		(0.458)		(0.461)		(0.456)		(0.469)
Constant	5.483	-103.844	31.288	-147.859	0.153	-105.059	93.909	-93.280
	(29.616)	(36.392)	(22.668)	(42.046)	(20.501)	(41.531)	(45.225)	(53.589)
Top=Middle	0.034	0.006	0.740	0.104	0.052	0.105	0.406	0.432
Top=Bottom	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
Middle=Bottom	0.703	0.678	0.002	0.231	0.419	0.530	0.087	0.079
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.384	0.752	0.357	0.761	0.494	0.740	0.373	0.733
N	41	41	39	39	41	41	41	41

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates using different measures of redistributive preferences from the ISSP data (bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses). The first two measures (Attitude inequality and Perception top taxes) are based on questions about income differences and taxation ("Differences in income in <country> are too large 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today for those with high incomes? 0: Much too high, 4: Much too low"). The other two measures (Attitude redistribution and Attitude top taxes) correspond more closely to desired levels of redistribution as the questions ask about redistributive concerns in absolute terms ("It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share? 0: Much smaller, 4: Much larger"). The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. The p-values from the Wald test comparing the coefficients of the different socioeconomic status groups are shown at the bottom of the table. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.14: Correlation of Alternative Preference Measures

	Att. inequality	Perc. top taxes	Att. redistribution	Att. top taxes
Panel A: Top 5%				
Att. inequality	1			
Perc. top taxes	0.417	1		
Att. redistribution	0.768	0.363	1	
Att. top taxes	0.416	0.430	0.492	1
Panel B: Middle 5%				
Att. inequality	1			
Perc. top taxes	0.322	1		
Att. redistribution	0.849	0.207	1	
Att. top taxes	0.693	0.369	0.599	1
Panel C: Bottom 5%				
Att. inequality	1			
Perc. top taxes	0.300	1		
Att. redistribution	0.801	0.324	1	
Att. top taxes	0.508	0.384	0.539	1

Notes: This table reports the correlation coefficients of the different preference measures across countries using the ISSP data. Panel A shows the correlation of preferences for the top 5%, Panel B for the middle 5%, and Panel C for the bottom 5%. The first two measures (Attitude inequality and Perception top taxes) are based on questions about income differences and taxation ("Differences in income in <country> are too large 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today for those with high incomes? 0: Much too high, 4: Much too low"). The other two measures (Attitude redistribution and Attitude top taxes) correspond more closely to desired levels of redistribution as the questions ask about redistributive concerns in absolute terms ("It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share? 0: Much smaller, 4: Much larger").

Table B.15: Alternative Measures of Redistribution

	Tax non-mineral		Redistribution Index 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top 5%	-2.096	-1.828	-0.454	-0.312
	(1.393)	(1.271)	(0.261)	(0.225)
Middle 5%	1.975	1.286	0.089	-0.021
	(1.584)	(1.392)	(0.274)	(0.246)
Bottom 5%	3.561	2.348	0.887	0.664
	(1.153)	(0.921)	(0.184)	(0.154)
ln(GDP per capita)		0.914		0.338
		(0.929)		(0.160)
ln(Population)		-0.185		-0.148
		(0.486)		(0.090)
Democracy		7.670		1.053
		(1.707)		(0.300)
Gini pre-tax		0.135		-0.016
		(0.136)		(0.024)
Constant	1.870	-8.485	-3.100	-4.544
	(3.745)	(8.482)	(0.707)	(1.590)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.300	0.482	0.364	0.521
N	88	88	87	87

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is non-mineral taxes in percent of GDP. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is a redistribution index, computed as the first principal component of the post-tax Gini, non-mineral taxes, social security taxes, and our measure of relative redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. *Social security* is missing for Vietnam. *Taxes non-mineral* exclude taxes from mineral revenues and social security contributions. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.16: Main Results with Additional Controls

	Relative redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	-2.655	-2.505	-3.729	-2.401	-2.653	-0.777
	(1.834)	(1.942)	(2.345)	(2.146)	(2.402)	(1.672)
Middle 5%	-0.747	-0.763	1.148	-0.698	-0.183	-1.549
	(2.314)	(2.214)	(2.561)	(2.261)	(2.395)	(2.012)
Bottom 5%	6.052	5.930	5.346	5.546	5.241	4.829
	(1.414)	(1.485)	(1.683)	(1.433)	(1.660)	(1.427)
ln(GDP per capita)	2.536	2.856	2.552	2.394	2.068	2.256
	(1.250)	(1.342)	(1.537)	(1.355)	(1.628)	(1.199)
ln(Population)	-1.760	-1.742	-1.939	-1.801	-1.703	-1.558
	(0.700)	(0.709)	(0.843)	(0.694)	(0.828)	(0.709)
Democracy	5.761	5.342	4.019	5.287	5.029	3.847
	(2.724)	(2.802)	(3.309)	(2.839)	(3.484)	(2.586)
Gini pre-tax	0.517	0.551	0.536	0.634	0.615	0.640
	(0.257)	(0.277)	(0.309)	(0.246)	(0.296)	(0.232)
Confidence in government		0.217			3.252	
		(3.460)			(3.665)	
Moral Universalism			2.848		3.902	
			(5.699)		(6.300)	
Ethnic fractionalization				-8.944	-12.506	
				(5.255)	(6.026)	
Constant	-43.923	-48.059	-40.433	-42.065	-37.034	-43.673
	(15.433)	(19.414)	(22.467)	(15.661)	(26.143)	(14.396)
Legal origin FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.529	0.531	0.533	0.575	0.581	0.615
N	91	89	75	87	73	91

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables Top 5%, Middle 5%, and Bottom 5% reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. Missing values for realized redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. The inclusion of fixed effects for English, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origin is indicated at the bottom of the table. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.17: Split Sample Analysis by Locus of Control

	Low LOC (Bottom 5%)			High LOC (Bottom 5%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	-3.326	-2.037	-1.903	-6.683	-4.433	-3.417
	(2.304)	(2.496)	(2.596)	(3.164)	(3.098)	(3.034)
Middle 5%	-1.949	-3.483	-4.511	4.383	4.408	2.888
	(2.856)	(2.557)	(2.719)	(4.414)	(3.840)	(3.992)
Bottom 5%	7.272	5.649	5.713	8.742	5.921	6.705
	(1.838)	(1.794)	(1.869)	(3.476)	(3.149)	(3.147)
ln(GDP per capita)		2.989	2.928		4.123	4.128
		(1.767)	(1.977)		(2.093)	(2.118)
ln(Population)		-3.250	-2.734		-0.875	-1.094
		(1.126)	(1.052)		(0.969)	(0.995)
Democracy		8.122	7.413		6.002	3.197
		(3.549)	(3.690)		(3.453)	(3.549)
Gini pre-tax			0.462			0.575
			(0.372)			(0.329)
Constant	2.259	-8.805	-26.831	-21.295	-55.067	-79.101
	(8.348)	(15.250)	(21.827)	(6.515)	(20.283)	(22.020)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.294	0.503	0.558	0.473	0.634	0.668
N	46	46	46	45	43	43

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. We split the sample into countries where the bottom 5% have a low average locus of control (columns 1 to 3) and a high average locus of control (columns 4 to 6). Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.18: SES Groups and Political Activism

	(1) Boycotts	(2) Strike	(3) Demonstration	(4) Petition	(5) Index
Top 5%	0.047	0.022	0.061	0.102	0.328
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.042)
Middle 5%	-0.003	-0.000	-0.004	-0.004	-0.021
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Bottom 5%	-0.039	-0.023	-0.054	-0.079	-0.288
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.025)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.052	0.040	0.046	0.243	0.089
N	214491	162881	218046	219430	152972
Countries	87	80	88	90	79

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. The dependent variables are dummy variables for joining boycotts (column 1), joining strikes (column 2), attending peaceful demonstrations (column 3), and signing a petition (column 4), and an index based on the first principal component of these four variablles (column 5). *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* are dummy variables for an individual belonging to the top 5%, the middle 5%, or the bottom 5% regarding the socioeconomic status index of a given country.

Table B.19: Including Controls for Political Activism of SES Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top 5%	-4.293	-3.682	-3.103	-3.040
	(1.929)	(2.141)	(2.051)	(2.009)
Middle 5%	1.529	-1.492	-2.515	-3.060
	(2.425)	(2.816)	(2.354)	(2.256)
Bottom 5%	7.277	7.706	6.854	6.822
	(1.605)	(1.673)	(1.453)	(1.441)
Polit. activ. Top 5%		3.021	1.544	-0.096
		(3.784)	(4.144)	(4.127)
Polit. activ. Middle 5%		6.761	3.570	1.902
		(6.861)	(6.447)	(6.636)
Polit. activ. Bottom 5%		3.168	5.708	7.079
		(6.328)	(5.924)	(5.632)
ln(GDP per capita)			1.902	2.870
			(1.744)	(1.781)
ln(Population)			-2.833	-2.577
			(0.836)	(0.809)
Democracy			4.812	3.909
			(3.136)	(3.014)
Gini pre-tax				0.489
				(0.282)
Constant	-9.441	-1.075	-5.208	-32.603
	(5.707)	(6.859)	(15.751)	(22.055)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.332	0.437	0.574	0.614
N	93	78	77	77

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. We control the political activism of the socioeconomic status groups. Political activism is the first principal component of the four variables shown in Table B.18. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.20: Attitudes and Average Tax Rates

	Avg. tax rate for incomes = 4x GDP p.c.		Avg. tax rate for incomes = 3x GDP p.c.		Avg. tax rate for incomes = 2x GDP p.c.		Avg. tax rate for incomes = GDP p.c.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Top 5%	-2.113	-2.247	-2.103	-2.117	-1.720	-1.804	-1.136	-1.204
	(1.914)	(1.624)	(1.746)	(1.495)	(1.520)	(1.333)	(1.083)	(1.037)
Middle 5%	2.428	0.798	2.080	0.498	1.768	0.517	1.314	0.390
	(2.232)	(2.281)	(2.090)	(2.137)	(1.826)	(1.877)	(1.289)	(1.387)
Bottom 5%	2.894	2.274	2.776	2.218	2.169	1.664	1.414	1.050
	(1.324)	(1.289)	(1.241)	(1.191)	(1.118)	(1.046)	(0.854)	(0.796)
ln(GDP per capita)		3.751		3.420		2.911		1.968
		(1.142)		(1.074)		(0.950)		(0.752)
ln(Population)		0.820		0.518		0.407		0.208
		(0.628)		(0.621)		(0.600)		(0.503)
Democracy		5.763		5.365		4.940		3.980
		(2.345)		(2.178)		(1.926)		(1.557)
Gini pre-tax		0.151		0.114		0.043		0.014
		(0.154)		(0.146)		(0.138)		(0.127)
Constant	-2.633	-38.897	-2.568	-33.990	-2.252	-26.683	-2.241	-17.865
	(4.728)	(11.997)	(4.564)	(11.357)	(4.121)	(10.490)	(2.967)	(8.921)
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.002
R-squared	0.210	0.395	0.200	0.374	0.163	0.327	0.121	0.254
N	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable are the average tax rates for incomes equivalent to 4-times the GDP p.c. (columns 1 and 2), incomes equivalent to 3-times the GDP p.c. (columns 3 and 4), incomes equivalent to 2-times the GDP p.c. (columns 5 and 6), and incomes equivalent to the GDP p.c. of a country (columns 7 and 8). The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. Tax rate data are from 2005. The average tax rate variables adjust for allowances/deductions, tax credits, significant local taxes and other main rules of the tax code. They do not adjust for deductions, exemptions, and credits that depend on taxpayer specific characteristics (for example, no adjustment is made for child credits). The rates do not account for evasion/avoidance. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.21: Policy Priorities by SES Group

	(1) Poverty	(2) Discrimination	(3) Sanitation	(4) Education	(5) Environment
Top 5%	-0.052	-0.001	-0.013	0.041	0.025
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Middle 5%	0.003	0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Bottom 5%	0.093	-0.010	-0.008	-0.032	-0.044
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.131	0.045	0.049	0.041	0.173
N	49901	49901	49901	49901	49901
Countries	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are dummy variables indicating respondents' answers to the question about the most serious problem in their country. The dependent variables indicate whether respondents have chosen people living in poverty and need (column 1), discrimination against girls and women (column 2), poor sanitation and infectious diseases (column 3), inadequate education (column 4), or environmental pollution (column 5) as the most serious problem. *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* are dummy variables for an individual belonging to the top 5%, the middle 5%, or the bottom 5% regarding the socioeconomic status index of a given country.

Table B.22: Shares of Political Orientation by SES Group

	Left	Right	Extreme	Swing
Top 5%	0.11	0.16	0.26	0.36
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Middle 5%	0.10	0.14	0.24	0.43
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Bottom 5%	0.13	0.18	0.32	0.39
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)

Notes: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (in parantheses) of political orientation for the different socioeconomic status groups. Political orientation is measured with the question: *In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?* We then classify individuals as follows: Right extrem = 0/1, moderate: 2-7, left extreme = 8/9, and swing voter = 4/5 (*extreme* refers to individuals being either left or right).

Table B.23: Split Sample Analysis by Extreme Political Orientation

	High Share Extreme		Low Share Extreme	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Top 5%	0.065	0.459	-7.335	-4.082
	(2.454)	(2.778)	(2.571)	(2.315)
Middle 5%	-3.683	-3.838	2.261	-4.463
	(3.455)	(3.535)	(2.711)	(3.510)
Bottom 5%	6.097	4.984	10.971	10.481
	(1.859)	(2.029)	(2.288)	(2.010)
ln(GDP per capita)		1.370		6.555
		(2.232)		(2.608)
ln(Population)		-2.266		-3.620
		(1.169)		(1.434)
Democracy		3.450		1.203
		(3.842)		(4.292)
Gini pre-tax		0.340		0.465
		(0.329)		(0.400)
Constant	-0.428	-18.590	-17.836	-68.297
	(6.970)	(24.702)	(8.521)	(23.583)
F-stat p-val	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.243	0.418	0.511	0.722
N	43	42	44	43

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. We split the sample into countries where the bottom 5% have a high share of extrimists (columns 1 to 3) and a low share of extremists (columns 4 to 6). Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.24: Weighted Attitudes and Relative Redistribution

	Relative redistribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	2.010			-4.532	-3.335	-2.999
	(1.698)			(1.945)	(1.826)	(1.836)
Middle 5%		5.521		1.438	0.278	-0.578
		(1.415)		(2.464)	(2.246)	(2.295)
Bottom 5%			6.589	7.455	6.003	6.070
			(0.910)	(1.631)	(1.369)	(1.409)
ln(GDP per capita)					2.242	2.435
					(1.243)	(1.246)
ln(Population)					-1.843	-1.670
					(0.766)	(0.710)
Democracy					7.557	5.837
					(2.709)	(2.736)
Gini pre-tax						0.520
						(0.256)
Constant	10.008	-6.111	-14.774	-9.189	-20.768	-43.176
	(6.001)	(5.530)	(4.163)	(5.667)	(11.408)	(15.267)
Top=Middle				0.121	0.317	0.503
Top=Bottom				0.000	0.000	0.000
Middle=Bottom				0.110	0.077	0.046
F-stat p-val	0.236	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.014	0.143	0.305	0.342	0.481	0.532
N	94	93	94	93	91	91

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables Top 5%, Middle 5%, and Bottom 5% reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. Missing values for realized redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. The p-values from the Wald test comparing the coefficients of the different socioeconomic status groups are shown at the bottom of the table. We use survey weights provided by the WVS to aggregate redistributive preferences within different socioeconomic groups in a given country. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.25: Weighted Attitudes and Alternative Measures of Redistribution

	Gini post-tax		Taxes		Social security		Redistribution index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Top 5%	1.725	1.468	-1.943	-0.021	-1.148	-0.845	-0.494	-0.243
	(1.314)	(0.851)	(1.514)	(1.204)	(0.715)	(0.661)	(0.267)	(0.208)
Middle 5%	0.851	0.202	0.631	-0.377	0.243	0.026	0.054	-0.083
	(1.295)	(1.001)	(1.920)	(1.342)	(0.772)	(0.731)	(0.277)	(0.224)
Bottom 5%	-3.340	-2.768	3.310	1.562	2.207	1.686	0.871	0.619
	(0.907)	(0.656)	(1.162)	(0.839)	(0.472)	(0.437)	(0.179)	(0.143)
ln(GDP per capita)		-1.181		4.578		0.855		0.521
		(0.587)		(0.856)		(0.460)		(0.132)
ln(Population)		0.705		-1.115		-0.119		-0.191
		(0.338)		(0.461)		(0.300)		(0.079)
Democracy		-2.997		2.130		2.162		0.799
		(1.161)		(1.645)		(1.001)		(0.282)
Gini pre-tax		0.666		-0.048		-0.018		-0.028
		(0.099)		(0.104)		(0.078)		(0.022)
Constant	43.399	24.623	10.907	-19.055	-1.920	-7.221	-2.738	-5.075
	(3.667)	(6.386)	(3.942)	(7.336)	(2.102)	(5.031)	(0.700)	(1.484)
Top=Middle	0.692	0.432	0.412	0.876	0.300	0.483	0.255	0.665
Top=Bottom	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.268	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Middle=Bottom	0.039	0.043	0.356	0.329	0.083	0.107	0.050	0.031
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.181	0.592	0.191	0.552	0.284	0.372	0.351	0.567
N	93	91	88	88	87	87	87	87

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the post-tax Gini, in columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is taxes in percent of GDP, and in columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable is social security taxes in percent of GDP. The dependent variable in columns 7 and 8 is a redistribution index, computed as the first principal component of the post-tax Gini, taxes, social security taxes, and our measure of relative redistribution. The variables Top 5%, Middle 5%, and Bottom 5% reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. The p-values from the Wald test comparing the coefficients of the different socioeconomic status groups are shown at the bottom of the table. We use survey weights provided by the WVS to aggregate redistributive preferences within different socioeconomic groups in a given country. *Taxes* is missing for Andorra, Hong Kong, Palestine, Puerto Rico, and Taiwan, *Social security* is further missing for Vietnam. *Taxes* exclude social security contributions. *Social security* are actual revenues receivable by social security schemes organized and operated by government units, for the benefit of the contributors to the scheme. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

Table B.26: Weighted Alternative Measures of Preferences

	Attitude inequality (change)		Perception top taxes (change)		Attitude redistribution (level)		Attitude top taxes (level)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Top 5%	-23.334	-18.851	-20.784	-10.705	-26.974	-16.379	-33.053	-17.895
	(5.449)	(5.074)	(6.428)	(5.364)	(7.023)	(4.736)	(9.884)	(9.779)
Middle 5%	10.367	16.464	-14.568	5.699	6.187	7.184	-29.483	-10.782
	(10.329)	(8.204)	(9.230)	(7.487)	(9.983)	(7.692)	(16.187)	(11.284)
Bottom 5%	14.787	5.511	26.221	15.743	21.159	12.699	30.115	21.320
	(9.111)	(6.179)	(8.022)	(5.820)	(8.502)	(7.931)	(12.863)	(10.027)
ln(GDP per capita)		7.457		10.587		7.043		10.339
		(2.956)		(3.649)		(3.876)		(3.456)
ln(Population)		-2.787		-2.435		-2.555		-2.274
		(0.807)		(0.954)		(0.877)		(1.297)
Democracy		-3.291		-2.138		0.614		0.146
		(4.550)		(5.790)		(5.082)		(5.428)
Gini pre-tax		1.069		1.337		0.828		0.748
		(0.435)		(0.463)		(0.431)		(0.506)
Constant	11.657	-98.371	37.093	-157.218	6.626	-91.720	113.290	-83.074
	(28.279)	(35.546)	(23.756)	(42.360)	(19.889)	(42.066)	(44.826)	(59.247)
Top=Middle	0.022	0.005	0.637	0.068	0.035	0.037	0.877	0.681
Top=Bottom	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004
Middle=Bottom	0.791	0.402	0.005	0.379	0.377	0.696	0.021	0.098
F-stat p-val	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.380	0.758	0.310	0.745	0.500	0.753	0.404	0.710
N	41	41	39	39	41	41	41	41

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates using different measures of redistributive preferences from the ISSP data (bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in parentheses). The first two measures (Attitude inequality and Perception top taxes) are based on questions about income differences and taxation ("Differences in income in <country> are too large 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today for those with high incomes? 0: Much too high, 4: Much too low"). The other two measures (Attitude redistribution and Attitude top taxes) correspond more closely to desired levels of redistribution as the questions ask about redistributive concerns in absolute terms ("It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share? 0: Much smaller, 4: Much larger"). The dependent variable is relative redistribution, defined as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax Gini index, scaled by pre-tax Gini. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in income inequality caused by government intervention (i.e., taxes and transfers), with higher values indicating more redistribution. The variables *Top 5%*, *Middle 5%*, and *Bottom 5%* reflect the redistributive preferences of different socioeconomic status groups. Socioeconomic status groups are defined as the bottom 5%, middle 5%, and top 5% of respondents based on our socioeconomic status index. The p-values from the Wald test comparing the coefficients of the different socioeconomic status groups are shown at the bottom of the table. We use survey weights provided by the ISSP to aggregate redistributive preferences within different socioeconomic groups in a given country. Missing values for relative redistribution are imputed using the estimates for pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the control variables.

C Additional mechanisms

Political extremism. Another possible explanation is that policymakers are more responsive to the demands of the bottom SES group because they fear that these individuals will vote for extreme parties. Alternatively, it could be that bottom SES individuals are more likely to be swing voters. To test these hypotheses, we use data from the WVS to compute the share of politically extreme individuals in each SES group, separately for each country. We also create a proxy for swing voters. For this purpose, we use the following question about political orientation: *In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?* We then classify individual as follows: extreme right = 0/1, extreme left = 8/9, and swing voter = 4/5. Appendix Table B.22 shows the average shares of extremists (left or right) and swing voters across all countries. We find that the middle SES group — not the bottom group — has the highest share of swing voters ($p < 0.003$). The bottom 5% group instead has a significantly higher share of politically extreme individuals than the middle and top SES groups ($p < 0.001$). However, when we split the sample based on the share of extremists among the bottom SES group, as shown in Appendix Table B.23, we find that the relationship between the bottom 5%'s preferences and actual redistribution is significantly stronger in countries where there is a lower share of extremists among the bottom SES group ($p = 0.019$). These findings thus do not support an explanation based on greater shares of swing voters or political extremists in the bottom than in the middle or top SES group.

Conformism. Another possibility for the correlation between the bottom 5%'s preferences and realized redistribution is that lower SES individuals may be more likely to conform to the majority view rather than forming their own independent opinions (e.g., because they are less educated, on average). However, Appendix Figure A.5 shows that the data do not support this conjecture. In fact, the bottom 5%'s preferences are the furthest away from both the modal and median attitudes, while the top SES group's preferences are closest to the modal attitude.

D Data

Preferences for Redistribution and Socioeconomic Status Index. To measure preferences for redistribution and socioeconomic status (SES), we use data from the World Value Survey (WVS). The WVS contains survey data from seven waves covering the years 1981 to 2020. We dropped data from wave 1 and wave 2, since there are no observations on income in wave 1 and no observations on social class in wave 2. We dropped wave 7 because the education variable is coded differently than in previous waves. This results in 312,577 observations covering the time period from 1995 to 2014.[28] We measure socioeconomic status using relative household income, education, and self-reported social class. To measure relative household income, respondents had to indicate to which income group their household belongs to on a 10-point scale (1: "lowest group", 10: "highest group"). Highest attained educational level is measured on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 "no formal education" to 9 "university-level education with degree". Self-reported social class is measured on a 5-point scale (1: "upper class", 5: "lower class"). We combine the three variables into an SES index using the first principal component. We rank respondents in each country based on the SES index and define bottom, middle, and top SES groups using the 5% ranges, 10% ranges, and terciles in the distribution of the index. In our main analysis, we focus on the 5% ranges (e.g., the top 5% consist of respondents ranking above the 95th percentile of the SES index).

To measure preferences for redistribution, respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes on a 10-point scale (1: "Incomes should be made more equal", 10: "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort".) We coded answers to this question so that higher values indicate a stronger preference for redistribution (with a range from 0 to 9). We compute the average preference for redistribution for respondents from the bottom, middle, and top SES group for every country over all waves. This leaves us with 237,986 observations for which we can measure both SES index and redistributive preferences. We exclude countries for which redistributive preferences of a given SES group are based on less

[28] There are 1,996 observations for Haiti from the year 2016.

than 30 observations (we lose observations for the Dominican Republic for all SES groups and the observation for Uganda for the middle 5% SES group).[29]

This results in a main sample of 93 countries: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Government Redistribution. Our measure of government redistribution comes from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID; see Solt, 2020 for an overview). The SWIID contains cross-national estimates of the Gini index of inequality in household disposable income (post-tax, post-transfer; $Gini_{postTax}$) and of the Gini index of inequality in household market income (pre-tax, pre-transfer; $Gini_{preTax}$). We compute our measure of relative redistribution as follows:

$$Relative\ Redistribution = 100 \times \frac{Gini_{preTax} - Gini_{postTax}}{Gini_{preTax}}$$

Relative Redistribution indicates the percentage reduction in market-income inequality due to taxes and transfers. Alternatively, we also use a measure of absolute redistribution,

[29]The median number of observations per country and SES groups are 123, 140, and 122 if we define SES groups based on 5% ranges.

which captures the reduction in market-income inequality (in Gini-index points) that is reduced due to taxes and transfers:

$$Absolute\ Redistribution = Gini_{preTax} - Gini_{postTax}$$

The SWIID provides estimates for both *Relative Redistribution* and *Absolute Redistribution*. These estimates are missing if estimates of $Gini_{preTax}$ and $Gini_{postTax}$ are based on the same observations in the source data, and the difference between them only reflects information derived from other countries. For these cases (44 out of the 94 countries), we impute *Relative Redistribution* and *Absolute Redistribution* using the estimates for $Gini_{preTax}$ and $Gini_{postTax}$. As displayed in Table B.8, our main results are robust to the exclusion of imputed SWIID data. Since our preference data were collected until 2014, we focus on the SWIID data from the year which is closest to 2015. For 82% of the observations the SWIID data are from 2015, 95% of the observations are after 2009, and the oldest observation is from 1998 (Kuwait).

Alternative Measures of Redistribution. As alternative measures of redistribution, we use the updated Relative Political Capacity dataset of Arbetman-Rabinowitz *et al.* (2020) (which has also been used by Acemoglu *et al.*, 2015). In particular, we use their 2015 data on taxes (both with and without taxes from mineral revenues) and social security taxes scaled by GDP (i.e., $100 * Taxes/GDP$). Tax data are missing for Andorra, Hong Kong, Palestine, Puerto Rico, and Taiwan; social security taxes data is also missing for Vietnam.

Alternative Measures of Preferences for Redistribution. To measure preferences for redistribution and socioeconomic status (SES), we use the Social Inequality module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). We use data from the 1992, 1999, and 2009 waves as this most closely matches the time span of the WVS data. We measure socioeconomic status using relative household self-reported social group, education, and self-reported

social class. To measure social group, respondents had to indicate to which social group they belong to on a 10-point scale (1: "bottom group", 10: "top group"). Highest attained educational level is measured on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 "no formal qualification" to 5 "university-degree completed". Self-reported social class is measured on a 6-point scale (1: "lower class", 5: "upper class"). We combine the three variables into an SES index using the first principal component. We rank respondents in each country based on the SES index and define bottom, middle, and top SES groups using the 5% ranges, 10% ranges, and terciles in the distribution of the index. In our main analysis, we focus on the 5% ranges (e.g., the top 5% consist of respondents ranking above the 95th percentile of the SES index).

The ISSP has four questions related to redistribution, two framed as preferences over the desired level of redistribution and two over desired changes relative to current circumstances. The first two measures are based on questions about income differences and taxation ("Differences in income in <country> are too large 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today for those with high incomes? 0: Much too high, 4: Much too low"). The other two measures correspond more closely to desired levels of redistribution as the questions ask about redistributive concerns in absolute terms ("It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. 0: Strongly disagree, 4: Strongly agree"; "Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share? 0: Much smaller, 4: Much larger"). We coded answers to this question so that higher values indicate a stronger preference for redistribution (with a range from 0 to 4). We compute the average preference for redistribution for respondents from the bottom, middle, and top SES group for every country over all waves. We exclude countries for which redistributive preferences of a given SES group are based on less than 30 observations (we lose observations for Canada for the middle 5% SES group).

This results in a main sample of 41 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bul-

garia, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela.

Average Tax Rates. We use the World Tax Indicators for data on average tax rates by income groups (`https://icepp.gsu.edu/what-we-do/research/world-tax-indicators/`). Since our preference data were collected until 2014, we use the most recent tax data from 2005. Tax data are missing for Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Palestine, Rwanda, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Control Variables. We control for a set of country characteristics in our analysis. Because our preference data was collected from 1995 onwards, we primarily use data from the year which is closest to 1994.

- *ln(GDP).* To control for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, we use data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 92% of the observations are from 1994, and the most recent observation is from 2003 (Iraq). GDP data are missing for Andorra and Palestine.

- *ln(Population).* To control for the natural logarithm of population, we use data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 93% of the observations are from 1994, and the most recent observation is from 2003 (Iraq). Population data are missing for Andorra and Palestine.

- *Democracy.* We follow Acemoglu *et al.* (2019) to measure the democratization of a country. Acemoglu *et al.* (2019) use Freedom House and Polity IV as the main sources to construct a dummy variable which indicates if a country is democratic (*Democracy*

= 1). A country is coded as democratic in a given year if Freedom House regards it as "free" or "partially free" and Polity IV gives it a positive democracy score (the Polity IV index ranges from -10 to 10). For countries for which the Polity IV index is missing, they use Cheibub *et al.* (2010) (CGV) and Boix *et al.* (2013) (BMR) as secondary sources and code a country as democratic if Freedom House regards it as 'free" or "'partially free," and either CGV or BMR consider them to be democratic. Acemoglu *et al.* (2019) provide data on democratization for 90 of the countries in our main sample in 1994. We impute the democracy measure for the 4 countries for which data is missing (Andorra, Hong Kong, Palestine, and Puerto Rico). We code Andorra as democratic using information from Freedom House, CGV, and BMR. We code Hong Kong as democratic since Freedom House regards it as "partially free" (in 1994-1995). We code Palestine as not democratic, since Freedom House regards it as "not free" (in 1996-1997). We code Puerto Rico as free since Freedom House regards it as "free" (in 1994-1995).

- *Confidence in government.* To control for the average level of confidence in the government, we use data from the WVS corresponding to the same survey waves as our preference data. Respondents were asked to indicate their confidence in the government on a 4-point scale (4: "None at all", 1: "A great deal".) We coded answers to this question so that higher values indicate a stronger confidence (with a range from 0 to 3). Confidence in government data is missing for Israel and Saudi Arabia.

- *Ethnic fractionalization.* To control for ethnic fractionalization, we use data from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalisation dataset for the year 1995. The ethnic fractionalization index ranges from 0, for no the case when all individuals are members of the same ethnic group, to 1, where each individual belongs to his or her own ethnic group. Ethnic fractionalization data is missing for Andorra, Hong Kong, India, Montenegro, Palestine, and Puerto Rico.

- *Moral universalism.* To control for the average level of moral universalism in a given country, we use data from the WVS corresponding to the same survey waves as our preference data. The WVS contains six questions about trust in specific groups. Three questions ask about trust in in-groups (family, neighbors, people you know personally) and the other three questions ask about trust in out-groups (people of another religion, people of another country, and people you meet for the first time). We define moral universalism as the difference between the average level of trust towards out-group members and the average level of trust towards in-group members. Moral universalism data is missing for Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia Herzegovina, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, North Macedonia, Tanzania, and Venezuela.

- *Legal origin.* To control for the legal origin of a country, we use data from La Porta *et al.* (2008). We distinguish between English, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins. Information on legal origin is missing for Andorra and Palestine.

E Preference Data from America's Top 5%

Data

Our data on redistributive preferences of the very wealthy in the U.S. come from Cohn *et al.* (2023). This dataset allows for a more precise coding on income and includes a substantial number of households with incomes above $750,000 and assets over $5 million. The top 5% is classified as the individuals with an annual household income of above $250,000 or gross liquid assets of $1 million or more (according to the Survey of Consumer Finances, the top 5% earners in the U.S. had an annual incomes of at least $260,000 in 2016). For comparison, the survey also includes a representative sample of Americans from the bottom 95% of the income distribution. The total sample consists of 882 individuals (top 5%: N = 465, bottom 95%: N = 417).

Our measure of redistributive preferences using the Cohn *et al.* (2023) data is based on respondents' answers to two questions: (i) whether they would prefer a higher or lower effective top income tax rate, and (ii) whether they would prefer a higher or lower effective estate tax rate (both measured on a five-point scale).

Results

We do observe a lower level of support for redistribution amongst the ultra-rich (incomes of $750,000 or more) relative to the merely well-off (incomes of $150,000-200,000), as illustrated in Figures E.1 and E.2. However, the differences are relatively small. Moreover, the data points for very high incomes merely extend the pattern we observe in Figure A.1 — there is a clear, near-monotonic decline in preferences for redistribution over the entire income distribution.

While this finding does not rule out the possibility that the redistributive preferences of the very wealthy might be positively correlated with realized redistribution, it does make this a harder argument to make, as the preferences of the very rich are most similar to those

Figure E.1: Attitudes towards top income tax of the ultra-rich



Notes: The figure shows the average attitudes towards the top income by income group. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

Figure E.2: Attitudes towards estate tax of the ultra-rich



Notes: The figure shows the average attitudes towards the estate tax by income group. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

of the well-off, and most dissimilar from the very poor.

F Prediction Study

We present an overview of the sample collection procedures and design below. The complete survey instrument is provided in Section F.3.

F.1 Laypeople Sample

We conducted an online prediction study in the U.S. to investigate laypeople's beliefs about the relationship between redistributive preferences and actual redistribution across different SES groups. We collected a sample of 500 adults from the panel provider Prolific. Our sample is representative of the general U.S. population in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity (49% male, 51% female; M age = 46.36, SD = 16.41; White/European American: 69%, Black/African American: 14.%, Asian/Asian American: 7%, Hispanic/Latino: 7%). Participants could only complete the survey if they passed a simple attention check. Participants received a participation fee of US$1.59, along with the opportunity to earn an extra payment of up to US$4.00.

Participants were told that they had to guess the findings of a recent scientific study, which investigates how much redistribution people from different countries want and how much governments actually redistribute. We then briefly described the key features of the study: we gave participants a definition of government redistribution and information on the data we used, and we explained how we (i) measured people's attitudes toward government redistribution, (ii) computed SES groups, and (iii) measured actual government redistribution.

We then asked participants to make their predictions and informed them that they should try their best, as the 10% most accurate participants would receive a bonus payment of US$3.00. First, participants had to rank the three SES groups (bottom, middle, and top 5% groups) according to how much their attitudes correspond to actual government redistribution (e.g., they would place the top SES group at the top of the ranking if they thought

their attitudes correspond most closely to actual redistribution). Second, participants had to rank the pairs of SES groups according to how similar their attitudes toward government redistribution are. Participants could report their rankings using drag and drop. For both predictions, the initial order of SES groups and pairs of SES groups was randomized between participants. We also asked participants to indicate how certain they are about the accuracy of their answers on a 7-point scale ("completely uncertain" to "completely certain"). Afterwards, participants could earn an additional payment of US$1.00 if they correctly answered two comprehension questions about the scientific study. Finally, participants provided basic demographic information including their age, gender, ethnicity, educational level, employment status, household income, social class, and political orientation. To measure educational level, household income, and social class, we used the survey items from the World Value Survey. This allowed us to compute an SES index for the participants of the prediction study in the same way as in our main study.

F.2 Expert Economists Sample

We also collected predictions from experts. To do so, we surveyed a group of top academic economists whose email addresses were publicly available on the Research Papers in Economics repository website (http://repec.org). We culled email addresses for economists who published in the last five years, and who ranked in the top 5% in at least one of the following dimensions on the website: "average rank," "citations," "citations, discounted by age," "h-index," "abstract views," and "downloads." We excluded economists who were familiar with our project. This procedure yielded 3,179 email addresses. We randomly selected 1,000 email addresses to which we sent out an invitation to participate in the study, and received 140 completed responses (89% male, 10% female, 1% other; mean age = 53.60, SD age = 11.04). Around two thirds of the participants were full professors and only 9% indicated that they were not professors (e.g., research economists and economic advisors). Participants were given the same instructions and were asked to make the same predictions as in the predic-

tion study with the laypeople. We did not include any attention check and comprehension questions in the expert prediction study. Participants did not receive a participation fee, but they were informed up front that the three most accurate respondents would receive a US$100 gift card, with the option of donating that money to a charity of their choice. At the end of the survey, we asked respondents to report their gender, age, and current academic status/ranking.

F.3 Full survey instrument (Layperson version)

Consent Form

This is a survey being conducted by researchers at the Boston University, the University of Michigan, and University of Zurich. All data collected in this survey are for research purposes only.

Task and Duration: We will ask you to make predictions about citizens' attitudes towards redistribution and the government's redistribution policies. It should take 10 minutes or less to complete the survey.

Compensation: For your participation, you will be paid a participation fee. You may receive additional money based on your choices and attention during the study (up to $4). It is therefore important that you read the instructions carefully. Any additional money you earn will be paid as a bonus at the end of the study once all responses have been collected.

Risk and Benefits: The risks to your participation in this study are those associated with basic computer tasks, including boredom, fatigue, or mild stress. The benefit to you is that you contribute to the advance of scientific knowledge.

Confidentiality: We will not ask any personally identifying information about you. The data may be published in aggregate form in scientific articles or academic presentations. Your personal identity will not be revealed.

Subject's Rights: Your participation is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time during the study. However, if you withdraw, you will not receive any money. For additional questions

about this research, you may contact Jeffrey Yusof at jeffrey.yusof@econ.uzh.ch.

Please indicate, in the box below, that you are at least 18 years old, a resident of the United States of America, have read and understood this consent form, and that you agree to participate in this study.

- I agree to participate in this study, and am at least 18 years of age and a US resident, and have read the consent form.

Attention Check

This study should take 10 minutes or less to complete. It is important that you take the time to read all instructions and that you read questions carefully before you answer them. Previous research has found that some people do not take the time to read everything that is displayed. To show that you read our questions carefully, please choose both 'Monday and 'Tuesday as your answer in the first question and type 'dart' into the 'Other' field of the second question.

Given the above, what are your preferred days to do sports? (Click all that apply)

- Monday
- Tuesday
- Wednesday
- Thursday
- Friday
- Saturday
- Sunday

Given the above, what is your favorite sport?

- American football
- Baseball
- Ice hockey
- Ice hockey
- Tennis
- Golf
- Wrestling
- Soccer
- Other:

Bonus payments

We want you to **guess the findings of a recent scientific study.**

- You can earn a **bonus of $3** depending on the accuracy of your guesses.
- In addition, you can earn an extra bonus of $1 if you answer correctly two questions about the details of the scientific study.

Study details

The scientific study is about how much redistribution people from different countries want and how much governments actually redistribute. Governments have many policies that aim to redistribute income from better-off citizens to less well-off citizens. These include direct cash transfers (i.e., welfare payments), and free or subsidized goods and services like food, housing, or healthcare. This assistance is paid for by taxes on better-off citizens.

First, we used international survey data on **people's opinions about government redistribution** (that is, how much they think the government should redistribute). Overall, 237,138 respondents from 93 countries participated in the World Values Survey. The map below shows the countries (in blue) represented in the survey:



The study focused only on those respondents who belong to the bottom 5%, middle 5%, or top 5% in terms of income, education, and self-reported social class in their country. From now on, we will refer to these respondents as the bottom class, middle class, and upper class in a given country.

Here is an example of the three social classes (in red) for a fictive country with 100 survey respondents:



We then computed **for each social class how much redistribution people want.**

Finally, we linked the international survey data with data on **actual government redistribution** (from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database or SWIID). This allowed

us to compare **how much redistribution people want** with **how much governments actually redistribute**, separately for each social class.

Your task

Now we want you to guess the results of this scientific study. Try your best to be accurate: **the 10% most accurate participants will receive a bonus payment of $3.**

Guess 1: Which social class's opinion corresponds most closely to how much the government redistributes?

Please rank the three social classes according to how much their opinions correspond to actual government redistribution. That is, you should place the social class whose opinions correspond most closely to actual redistribution at the top of the ranking and the social class whose opinions correspond the least to actual redistribution at the bottom of the ranking.

Use the left mouse button to drag and drop and guess the ranking.
(Drag and drop ranking: Bottom class, Middle class, Upper class)

Certainty:
How certain are you about the accuracy of your answer?
(7-point Radio buttons: "Completely uncertain" to "completely certain")

Guess 2: Which social classes are the most similar in terms of how much redistribution they want?

Please rank the pairs of social classes according to how similar their opinions about government redistribution are. That is, you should place the pair whose opinions are most similar to one another at the top of the ranking and the pair whose opinions are least similar to one another at the bottom of the ranking.

Use the left mouse button to drag and drop and guess the ranking.
(Drag and drop ranking: Bottom and middle class, Bottom and upper class, Middle and

upper class)

Certainty:

How certain are you about the accuracy of your answer?

(7-point Radio buttons: "Completely uncertain" to "completely certain")

You now have another opportunity to earn extra money:

We will now ask you two questions about the details of the scientific study. If you answer both questions correctly, you will earn $1 in addition to what you have already earned.

Question 1: Which characteristics do we consider in this study to divide participants into bottom class, middle class and upper class? (Check all that apply, only one is wrong)

- Income
- Education
- Self-reported social class
- Neighborhood quality

Question 2: How did we measure actual levels of government redistribution?

- We used international data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- We used international data from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID).
- We hired a consulting company that conducted an audit of the financial statements.

Although the study focused only on government redistribution, we are also interested in what you think these relationships would look like for other public policies. Since we did not analyze data on other policies, we cannot pay an accuracy bonus for these guesses.

For each government policy described below, please rank the three social classes according to how much their opinions correspond to what the government actually does. That is, you should place the social class whose opinions correspond most closely to actual government policy at the top of the ranking and the social class whose opinions correspond the least to actual government policy at the bottom of the ranking.

Use the left mouse button to drag and drop and guess the ranking.
(Drag and drop ranking: Bottom class, Middle class, Upper class)

- Immigration: Controlling borders and imposing restrictions on immigration.
- Environment: Protecting the environment (e.g., reducing CO2 emissions) through regulation.
- International Trade: Protecting domestic jobs from international competition and promoting domestic products.

Demographics

Please tell us about yourself so we can put your other replies in greater context:

- What is your age?
- Waht is your gender?
  - Male
  - Female
  - Other:
- What is the primary ethnicity or race you identify with?
  - Asian/Asian American
  - Black/African American

  - White/European American
  - Hispanic/Latino
  - Other

- Were you born in the United States? (Yes, No)
- What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
  - No formal education
  - Incomplete primary school
  - Complete primary school
  - Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
  - Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
  - Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
  - Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
  - Some university-level education, without degree
  - University-level education, with degree
- We would like to know in what income group your household is in your country on a scale from 1 (lowest income group) to 10 (highest income group). Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. (10 Categories: 1 Lowest income group – 10: Highest income group)
- People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:
  - Upper class
  - Upper middle class
  - Lower middle class

  - Working class
  - Lower class

- What is your current employment status?
  - Full-time employee
  - Part-time employee
  - Self-employed or small business owner
  - Unemployed
  - Student
  - Not in labor force (for example: retired, or full-time parent)

- In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (10-point Scale: 1: Left to 10: Right)

End of Survey

Thank you very much for participating in this study! How well did you understand the instructions for the prediction tasks?
(7-point Radio buttons: "Did not understand them at all" to "fully understood them")

Do you have any comments or suggestions you would like to share with the researchers who designed this study? Is there anything you found unclear or confusing? Are there questions you had wished we asked? Please let us know what you think.